

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~NARCOTICS

The basic security problem posed by the Intelligence Community's cooperation with LEA's in the narcotics field lies in the need to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, either in the trial process, or by hostile penetration/subversion of the LEA recipients.

One method of addressing the first aspect would be to have the DCI direct that all intelligence furnished to the LEA be carefully sanitized and released with the caveat that it is for lead purposes only and not to be entered in a chain of evidence subject to legal motions for discovery. A suggested mechanism to accomplish this could be a DCI letter to the NFIB principals.

The other side of the problem, to improve the internal security of the LEA Community, is more difficult to address since it falls, organizationally outside the DCI's mandate. The Community should, of course, encourage DEA initiatives to obtain secure voice communications between their offices and preclude the intelligence furnished them from being included in unclassified data bases. The personnel security posture of the LEA Community remains a vexing issue.

There is an inherent risk in passing sensitive intelligence data to individuals outside the Intelligence Community's discipline whose clearance is based on National Agency checks. The track record of LEA officers being corrupted and "bought" by their erstwhile targets cannot be ignored. Yet to insist that they meet DCID 1/14 personnel security standards might pose an unacceptable investigative burden upon the LEA's.

There seems no quick fix to this problem, but it is one which seems appropriate to raise for discussion between the Community and LEA members at the CIPC level.

The resource implications of having the Intelligence Community somehow "monitor" the LEA's compliance makes it unrealistic even to suggest.

Chief, OS/SSC